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 Whilst Cumulative Prospect theory (CPT) provides an explanation of gambling 
on longshots at actuarially unfair odds, it cannot explain why people might bet on 
more favoured outcomes. This paper shows that this is explicable if the degree of 
loss aversion experienced by the agent is reduced for small-stake gambles (as a 
proportion of wealth), and probability distortions are greater over losses than 
gains.  If the utility or value function is assumed to be bounded, the degree of 
loss aversion assumed by Kahneman and Tversky leads to absurd predictions, 
reminiscent of those pointed out by Rabin (2000), of refusal to accept infinite gain 
bets at low probabilities.    
Boundedness of the value function in CPT implies that the indifference curve 
between expected-return and win-probability will typically exhibit both an 
asymptote (implying rejection of an infinite gain bet) and a minimum at low 
probabilities, as the shape of the value function dominates the probability 
weighting function. Also the high probability section of the indifference curve will 
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 Cumulative Prospect Theory and Gambling  
 
There is, however, one common observation which tells against the prevalence 
of risk aversion, namely, that people gamble ...I will not dwell on this point 
extensively, emulating rather the preacher, who, expounding a subtle 
theological point to his congregation, frankly stated: "Brethren, here there is a 






The non-expected utility model proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992), which they called Cumulative Prospect theory 
(CPT), has three key features. The first is that from a given reference point 
agents are risk-averse over potential gains but risk-loving over potential losses. 
Second, the utility or value function exhibits loss aversion so that the slope 
changes abruptly at the reference point.  In particular, the function is postulated 
to fall roughly twice as fast over losses as it rises over gains, exhibiting 
diminishing sensitivity as the marginal impact of losses or gains diminishes with 
distance from the reference point [see e.g. Tversky and Kahneman (1992)].   
Third, the probabilities of events are subjectively distorted by agents, via an 
inverted s-shaped probability weighting function so that small probabilities are 
exaggerated, and large probabilities are understated. The CPT model is able to 
resolve the Allais paradox [see e.g. Allais and Hagen (1979)] and also explains a 
variety of experimental evidence which is inconsistent with standard expected-
utility theory [see e.g. Starmer (2000), Rabin (2000), Rabin and Thaler (2001), 
and Thaler (1985)]. 
i  
  2Of particular importance is the probability weighting function, which can generate 
what Tversky and Kahneman (1992) call the most distinctive implication of CPT, 
namely the four-fold pattern of risk attitudes.  This may arise because the normal 
risk-averse and risk-seeking preferences for gains and losses respectively may 
be reversed by the overweighting of small probabilities.  
Prelec (2000) notes that for the four-fold pattern to emerge in general, 
probability weighting must over-ride the curvature of the value function; 
sometimes it works in favour and sometimes against the pattern
ii. 
He suggests that the purchase of lottery tickets, for instance, indicates that 
probability over-weighting is strong enough to compensate for three 
factors which militate against such purchases, namely the concavity of the 
value function (which diminishes the value of the prize relative to the 
ticket price), loss aversion, and the fact that lottery tickets sell at an 
actuarially unfair price.  
It is interesting that Prelec refers to outcomes in gambling markets as supporting 
CPT.  This is also true of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), who note that CPT 
predicts insurance and gambling for small probabilities but state that “the present 
analysis falls far short of a fully adequate account of these complex phenomena”.  
In fact there has been little discussion of whether CPT can provide a coherent 
explanation of gambling at actuarially unfair odds.  Given that the great majority 
of people in developed countries participate in gambling, at least occasionally, 
iii 
and that gambles often involve large stakes,
iv many would argue that an ability to 
explain outcomes observed in gambling markets [see Sauer (1998) and Vaughan 
  3Williams (1999) for comprehensive surveys] is at least as important a test of a 
theoretical model as consistency with experimental evidence on the risk attitudes 
of small samples of students. 
Of course, it is still the case that some economists explain gambling by invoking 
non-pecuniary returns such as excitement, buying a dream or entertainment [see 
e.g. Clotfelter and Cook (1989)].
v  However, there are convincing a priori and 
empirical reasons for giving little weight to this rationalisation in general. 
Friedman and Savage (1948) provide one convincing a  priori critique of the 
entertainment rationale
vi.  Subsequently a number of surveys of gamblers have 
been conducted in which respondents are asked to cite the main reasons why 
they gamble. The predominant response, usually by 42%-70%, is for financial 
reasons - “to make money” [see e.g. Cornis (1978), and The Wager (2000 b)].
vii  
Given this background, the purpose in this paper is to consider the implications of 
CPT for gambling over mixed prospects. With the standard assumptions, 
gambling on longshots at actuarially unfair odds can optimally occur, but betting 
on 50/50 and odds-on chances cannot.  We show the conditions in which the 
curvature of the value function can modify these results.  In particular, (a) if 
stakes are not too large the assumption of ultimate boundedness of the value 
function will imply a minimum in the indifference curve in expected return-win 
probability space, (b) the indifference curve will typically exhibit an asymptote at 
very small probabilities, indicating that the agent would turn down a bet involving 
the possibility of an infinite gain; (c) depending on the degree of risk aversion   
assumed over gains, the asymptote can occur at any probability in the 0 -1 
  4range; (d), in the absence of probability distortion agents will, paradoxically, 
ultimately accept very large  bets on odds-on chances at actuarially unfair odds  .  
 Finally, we illustrate how  modification of the CPT model, such that agents are 
less loss averse over small- stake gambles than over large ones, and that 
probability distortions over gains are less than over losses,  can explain both 
gambling on favoured outcomes, and also the favourite-longshot bias observed in 
most  gambling markets. 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  In Section two we consider the 
implications of the CPT model for the shape of the indifference curve between 
expected-return and win-probability for mixed prospects.   Section three develops 
further implications by assuming a particular parametric form of the Kahneman-
Tversky function, and Section four contains a brief conclusion. 
 
 2.  The Indifference Curve between Expected-return and Win-probability    
Defining reference point utility as zero, for a gamble to occur in CPT we require 
expected utility or value to be non-negative:
viii
- ( ) ( )  w (1- ) ( )   0  
rl EU w p U so p U s
+ =− ≥
p )
                                                              (1) 
where the win-probability is given by p, and the functions  and   are  
non-linear s-shaped probability weighting functions.   Us  is the value derived 
from a winning gamble, where  are the odds and  the stake.  U  is the 
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where the expected return from a  unit gamble ,µ , is defined as 
  µ =+ po ( 1 )                                                                                                         (3) 
A bet is said to be actuarially fair whenµ =1. 
From (2) we have that   ss p = (,) µ if 0 EU ≥ .  Substituting ss p = (,) µ  into (1) 
gives expected utility or value,   as a function of  EU, µ  and p, and hence an 
indifference map in (,) µ p  space may be obtained by differentiating (1) with 
respect to  p and equating to zero, in order to find the combinations of expected 
return,µ , and probability,  p, between which the bettor is indifferent.  This 
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where   is the elasticity of U ,   is the elasticity of the probability weighting 
function over gains (strictly positive), and  is the elasticity of the probability 
weighting function over losses (strictly negative).   Equation (5) also holds for any 






  6We observe from inspection of (5) that the slope of the indifference curve can 
exhibit turning points, and can be positive or negative depending on particular 
parameter values.  For risk-loving behaviour it is necessary that the slope of the 
indifference curve be positive over some region of its domain.  From inspection of 
(5) we observe that this possibility is enhanced when the elasticities of the 
probability weighting functions are small compared to the elasticity of the value 
function over gains. The size of stake will also influence the slope of the 
indifference curve by changing the elasticity of the value function over gains, and   
by affecting the ratio of the utility loss to the utility gain from the gamble. 




, can be 





<1 and µ >1 everywhere. 
  
 
     3. A Parametric Example of the Kahneman - Tversky  Model 
In order to generate further predictions from the analytical framework set out 
above, we need to specify a parametric form for the Kahneman -Tversky model. 
Because of serious limitations of the power value function (assumed by 
Kahneman–Tversky) in this framework we employ the exponential value 
function,
ix where EU is given by  
- ( )(1 )  w (1- ) (1- )   0  
rs o s EU w p e p e
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+− − =− − ≥                                                      (6) 
where r,δ λ   and       are positive constants. 
  7The value function in (6) has upper and lower bounds as is commonly assumed, 
e.g. Markowitz (1952) and Machina (1982).  The resolution of the St. Petersburg 
Paradox requires this assumption [see, e.g. Menger (1967) and Bassett (1997)]. 
The degree of loss aversion, (LA), for this value function is defined by the ratio of 
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0, so that the degree of loss aversion increases with stake size, we 
also require that r ≥1.  
























                                                                                                (8)  
The second-order condition for a maximum requires that   ro− > 10 . 
 Note from (8) that both the numerator and denominator of (8) are positive at an 
optimum.  The second-order condition implies that rapidly diminishing returns to 
increases in wealth (a larger ) are a necessary condition for optimally betting on 
more favoured outcomes. 
  8The numerator of (8) shows how the probability weighting function interacts with 
the degree of loss aversion (measured by 
r
λ
).   Obviously, loss aversion itself 






.   For a typical functional form and parameter values of the probability 
weighting function [Tversky and Kahneman (1992)],
x  we plot in Figures 1(a) to 
1(f) some probability weighting functions and their elasticities,  over 
gains and losses to illustrate their numeric values over the probability range. 
 (  εε
gp lp ,) ,







,     appears in the optimal stake 
equation (8) above, and the magnitude of its impact on the decision to gamble, 
relative to the distortion-free case is given by 
()







This is plotted 
in Figures 2(a) and 2(b).  We observe that the elasticity of the probability 
weighting function becomes infinitely large as p approaches 1, and is less than 
one when p=0.  
 Taking the estimates reported by  Tversky and Kahneman  (1992),  we observe 
from Figure 2(a) that the probability weighting function enhances the attraction of 
longshot gambles per se, but diminishes the attraction of more favoured 
outcomes, with the cross-over occurring at probabilities of around 0.45.  When 






  9Figures 1 (a) -1(d) 




 (a)  Probability Weighting Function                                            (b) Elasticity of the PWF over Gains 
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  10Figures 1 (e) -1(f) 








Figures 2(a) -2(b)  
















wp − − () 1



















−= − = −= − =





.( ) . , . , ( ) .





10 9 1 0 5 9 2 10 5 1 0 3 5 4





 ,     
 











































 ,      
 
   
















































































































σρ  (Tversky and Kahneman (1992)) 
    occur at much higher probabilities, illustrated in Figure 2(b).
xi   However, from 
inspection of (8), even in this case the probability distortion is insufficient to 
overcome the degree of loss aversion assumed by Kahneman and Tversky (at 
least 2), so that betting on even-money or odds-on chances is ruled out.   
Experiments reported in the literature are often based on asking agents what 
they would need to  win in order to induce them to bet a particular fixed amount 
at specific win-probabilities (usually 0.5).   Intuitively, there is no reason to expect 
required winnings to increase linearly either with stake size or with win-
probability.  It is instructive, therefore, to examine the indifference curve between 
expected -return and win-probability for a given fixed stake. 
Using the exponential value function described earlier, the slope of the 





















1 − ) }                                                          (9) 
It is extremely unlikely that any plausible mix of parameter values would make 
this equation equal to zero everywhere (implying a flat linear indifference curve 
between expected return and win-probability), and it is clearly possible for the 
indifference curve to exhibit a maximum or a minimum,  depending on the 
particular parameter values assumed.  




 will ultimately become negative so that the 
agent will act as an expected-utility maximiser, provided that  1 µ ≥ .   In this case, 
contrary to Prelec’s (2000, p.90) conjecture, the boundedness of the value 
  12function dominates the probability weighting function, so that there is a range of 
behaviour not obtainable in his analysis.  




< 0, and this may 
occur over the whole of the probability range so that the agent will again appear 
to behave as a expected utility maximiser, so long as µ >1 which will be the case 
for large enough stakes.  
 There are two further important implications of boundedness.   First, from (1) the 
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When utility is bounded from above,  a limit, say 1, as so .    The 
agent would then turn down an infinite gain bet if  
()
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Consequently, there is a win-probability threshold beyond which infinite gain bets 
will be turned down, even with small stakes.  This is an implication of utility 
bounded from above; the precise threshold will depend on particular parameter 
values, as illustrated below.  
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  13since  .   As a consequence, the agent would 
then be prepared to gamble at actuarially unfair odds at some large enough 
stake.  Essentially, risk-loving behaviour over losses (which are bounded) implies 
that the agent would accept a large bet at actuarially unfair odds, since the size 
of the losses ceases to matter.  
Us Us o
lr () ( ) →→ λ and   as s   1 → ∞
In order to rule out such gambles arising from curvature of the value function per 
se, the degree of loss aversion has to become very large over large-stake 
gambles (a large value ofλ ).   With λ =90, for example, so that the gain from a 
symmetric  gamble that could lead to bankruptcy is ninety times less than the 
pain of loss, gambles would be rejected unless they offered win-probabilities of 
more than  90/91.    It seems relevant to note that such gambles are not 
observed in practice.   
Some of the above possibilities are illustrated in Figures 3(a) – 4.   In Figure 3(a) 
expected utility is plotted against win-probability when the stake is set optimally, 
the degree of loss aversion is as postulated by Kahneman and Tversky, and the 
probability weighting function has the parameter estimates suggested in the 
experimental literature. The agent is observed optimally gambling on a longshot 
where the expected loss per unit staked is 0.45, so µ = 055 ..  The distortion to 
probabilities caused by the probability weighting function overcomes the 
disinclination to gamble caused by the degree of loss aversion, so that the agent 
bets on longshots.  
In Figures 3(b), 3(c) and 3(d) we plot the indifference curves between expected 
return and win-probability for a small constant sδ.
xii   Figure 3(b) illustrates that    
  14Figures 3(a) -3(d) 
                           Expected Utility, Expected Return and Probability for CPT 
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 can be negative when expected returns are less than unity, a feature that 
cannot occur in the standard expected-utility model.    Also note from Figure 3(b) 
that the indifference curve has a maximum in the favourite end of the spectrum at 
better than actuarially fair odds.   In Figure 3(c) we observe that the indifference 
curve exhibits a minimum, and in Figure 3(d) an asymptote, so that the agent 
turns down a gamble with infinite expected return, at an extremely small 
probability.  In this case, the boundedness of the value function ultimately 
“overpowers” the probability weighting function contrary to previous models in the 
literature.    
In Figure 4 we plot the indifference curves between expected return and win-
probability for a large sδ , noting that with power value functions the magnitude of 
the stake has little influence on the gambling decision.  The key features are that 
the asymptote now occurs at a higher win-probability, and the indifference curve 
is negatively sloped throughout its range. The interaction of high stakes and the 
curvature of the value function dominate the influence of the probability weighting 
function. 
 By choice of  sδ  and other parameter values we can position the asymptote at 
any win-probability.  In this context, we note that the high degree of loss aversion 
assumed by Kahneman and Tversky for the symmetric ten dollar bet apparently 
implies “absurd” behaviour for non-symmetric ten dollar gambles involving lower 
win-probabilities.  For example, using the exponential value function, with 
parameters  45, 90, 0.0001 r λ δ === , and the probability weighting functions of 
Kahneman  and Tversky (1992), with parameters of 0.61 for gains and 0.69 for 
  16losses, we calculate that in order to bet $10, with win-probability of 0.5, the agent 
would need to win at least $18.13 (plausibly less than that of the students in the 
Kahneman-Tversky experiments).   In addition, this agent would accept a bet to 
win infinity or lose $100 at win probability of 0.5 (EU = 0093 . ), unlike the 
expected-utility maximiser, who would (absurdly) reject this gamble, as 
demonstrated by Rabin (2000).   Indeed, our agent would accept this $100 
gamble if the potential gain were more than $336.1, which is much more 
plausible than Rabin’s example.   However, this Kahneman-Tversky agent would 
reject a bet to win infinity or lose $10 at a win-probability of 0.02 or less.   This 
rejection seems just as absurd as that of the expected-utility maximiser.  A similar 
result is obtained with the more flexible expo-power value function. 
xiii    
Figure 4 
                                                   Expected Return and Probability for CPT  
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This type of calibration raises the question as to whether the degree of loss 
aversion assumed by Kahneman and Tversky, based on student responses, is 
too large to be widely applicable to other agents.
xiv  
Certainly, the under-weighting of high probabilities, in conjunction with the degree 
of loss aversion assumed by Kahneman and Tversky , makes an explanation of 
observed gambling on even-money or odds-on chances impossible in Cumulative 
Prospect theory; for example, gambling at actuarially unfair odds on the NFL, 
evens chances at roulette, and odds-on favourites in horse-racing.   This seems 
to be a major failure of the theory.   Leroy (2003) makes a related point about the 
assumed degree of loss aversion in the context of more traditional asset markets. 
He questions who would actually turn down a bet to win $11 or lose $10 at a win- 
probability of 0.5 (as the Kahneman-Tversky students do), noting that such 
gambles have risk−return characteristics  superior to those of the daily returns on 
common stocks, which individuals generally find acceptable. 
 
Kahneman-Tversky agents with less loss aversion  
 With this point in mind, we relax the degree of loss aversion over small stakes.
xv 
In addition, we allow the probability distortion over losses to be slightly greater 
than over gains, as suggested by the empirical work of Jullien and Salanie 
(2000).
xvi  In Figures 5(a) and 5(b) the agent exhibits loss aversion over all wealth 
ranges, but initially less than assumed by Kahneman and Tversky.   Observe in 
Figure 5(b) that over the win-probability range typically observed in horse-racing 
  18(0.01 - 0.7), the indifference curve has the shape of the typical favourite–longshot 




Figures 5(a) - 5(c) 
                                     Expected Utility, Expected Return and Probability for a   
                                Less Loss Averse Gambler under CPT 
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  19 
induces a maximum in the indifference curve for extreme favourites, requiring 
positive rates of return. 
Clearly, if a Kahneman-Tversky agent is assumed not to be loss averse for small 
stakes, but is gain-loving instead, so that 
r
k
>1,  the indifference curve is 
qualitatively similar in shape to the previous case, except that the range of win-
probabilities at which the agent would accept actuarially unfair bets is extended 
to include very strong favourites in excess of 0.7 win probability. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Surveys show that a high proportion of adults regularly gamble at actuarially 
unfair odds in most developed countries; many bets are sizeable and most of the 
money bet is on favourites; most people gamble primarily for financial gain.  It 
therefore appears from survey evidence, from consideration of the pattern of 
money bet and from a priori reasoning that entertainment per se cannot explain 
outcomes in gambling markets.   Whilst Cumulative Prospect theory provides an 
explanation of gambling on longshots (low probability bets) at actuarially unfair 
odds, gambling on more favoured outcomes is inexplicable.   
This paper shows that gambling on more favoured outcomes, at actuarially unfair 
odds, can be explained if the degree of loss aversion experienced by the agent is 
reduced over small-stake gambles (as a proportion of wealth), and probability 
distortions are assumed to be greater over losses than gains.  It is also 
  20suggested that the degree of loss aversion assumed by Kahneman and Tversky 
leads to absurd predictions that infinite gain bets would be rejected at low win-
probabilities if the value function is assumed to be bounded. 
Boundedness of the value function in Cumulative Prospect theory implies that the 
indifference curve between expected-return and win-probability will exhibit both 
an asymptote (implying rejection of an infinite-gain bet) and a minimum  at low 
win-probabilities, because the shape of the value function dominates the 
probability weighting function, contrary to Prelec’s (2000) conjecture.  Also, a 
maximum will occur at high win-probabilities.  These implications, which seem to 
be new, are consistent with gambling market outcomes, and may explain why 
lotteries typically offer relatively high expected returns compared to betting on 
longshots in horse-racing, and why there may sometimes be a reverse bias in 
horse-racing.  
  It is also demonstrated that boundedness of the value function paradoxically 
creates an incentive for an agent to engage in large-stake gambles involving high 
probabilities at actuarially unfair odds.  Increasing the degree of loss aversion 
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Endnotes: 
￿
                                                           
i For instance the apparent preference of some agents for segregated gains reported by 
Thaler (1985, p. 203) whose survey evidence indicated that most people believe that a 
person would be happier to win $50 plus $25 in separate lotteries rather than $75 in a 
single lottery. An excellent discussion of this experimental evidence can be found in 
Starmer (2000).  Rabin (2000) provides further indirect support for CPT, in 
demonstrating that the assumption of global risk-aversion has implications for agents’ 
preferences with respect to small and large gambles that appear untenable a priori.  In 
particular, he shows that if an agent turns down a gamble to win $11 or lose $10, each 
with probability 0.5, at all prevailing wealth levels, then she will also turn down a bet to 
win infinity or lose $100 gamble, each with probability 0.5.   In addition, Rabin notes that 
the assumption of global risk-aversion implies that agents who turn down a gamble to 
lose $100  or win $200 with win-probability 0.5, would turn down a sequence of N such 
bets, say, N=100, as shown by Samuelson (1963).  Again, this appears absurd a priori. 
As a consequence of these implications, Rabin suggests that economists should reject 
standard expected-utility theory in favour of some version of the non-expected utility 
model,such as that proposed by Kahneman and Tversky. 
 
ii He suggests that probability non-linearity will eventually be recognised as a more 
important determinant of risk attitudes than money non-linearity, at least in situations 
in which one is comparing only amongst gain (or loss) prospects.  He notes, however, 
that for mixed prospects involving losses and gains, the assumption of loss aversion will 
become a critical additional factor. 
 
iii The proportion of people reported as gambling varies little between countries and is 
uniformly high.  For instance, in 1998 68% of respondents in the United States reported 
gambling at least once in the previous year. Legal gambling losses in America totalled 
over $50 billion, and illegal gambling has been estimated at over $100 billion - greater 
than the estimated expenditure on illegal drugs [see e. g. Strumpf (2003), Pathological 
Gambling (1999), and The Wager (2000a)]. 
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iv Strumpf (2003), in his study of six illegal bookmakers in New York City over the period 
1995-2000 (two of which had turnover in excess $100 million per annum), reports that 
average bet size was relatively large for these firms, averaging in excess of  $1000. We also 
note that observation of high rollers on odd/even bets at roulette is folklore. 
 
v  Psychologists provide many explanations of gambling; for example, that it is a 
substitute for masturbation, or represents an erotisation of fear, or is a sublimation of 
oedipal aggression towards the father.  All these and other psychological explanations are 
reviewed in Lidner (1950).  More recent explanations of pathological gambling have 
hypothesised a genetic rationale (see, e.g. The Wager, Feb 20, 2002). 
 
vi They note that (a) entertainment could be purchased separately, in principle, by paying 
admission to participate in a game using valueless chips, (b) that the gambler could buy 
the gamble by having an agent play the game for him according to detailed instructions 
and (c) gambles are often purchased in almost pure form: Friedman and Savage gave the 
example of the Irish sweepstake tickets at that time, where the purchaser is not a spectator 
to the drawing of the winner.   
 
vii Also see Bruce and Johnson (1992), who examine 1200 bets on horse races randomly 
selected from a larger sample of bets in the UK in March and April 1987.  The betting 
pattern before the off, and the much larger absolute average size of bet immediately 
before the off, leads them to conclude that “undoubtedly, the most striking conclusion 
relates to the unambiguous confirmation of the existence of a subset motivated by 
financial returns”.  
It is also important to note that a fixed entertainment value of gambling, with small-stake 
betting by near risk-neutral agents, predicts equality of expected returns across the 
expected return-win probability indifference curve.  This poses a major problem, since it 
is inconsistent with the favourite-longshot bias, (in which bets on longshots (low- 
probability bets) have low mean returns relative to bets on favourites ( high probability 
bets),  one of the key empirical findings observed in numerous studies of horse-race 
betting and other gambling markets [see e.g. Sauer (1998), Vaughan Williams (1999)].  
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Modification to allow for differential excitement based on the outcome odds can explain 
small-stake gambles  on longshots [see Conlisk (1994)], but cannot explain betting on 
more favoured horses or the fact that, by construction, the greatest volume of money is 
bet on such horses, often involving large stakes.  For instance, in US racetrack betting 
Golec and Tamarkin (1998) point out that for a race with an even-money favourite (i.e. 
with odds of 1/1), about 42% of the money bet is on the favourite (with track take of 
17%).  For a race favourite at 2/1 it would be about 28%.  Bruce and Johnson (1992) 
report that average stakes on first favourites in the UK were £22.63, and on second 
favourites £6.40.   
 
viii If we define the current level of wealth as W , and the level of utility associated with 
W  as U  then the exponential utility function  
UUU Wx =+ + ()
,
                                                                                                            (a) 
defines utility for increases in wealth above W  where W x +  is wealth measured from 













2 ,  < 0.  For a decrease in wealth belowW , we define the utility 
function as 
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( )                                                                            (c)   
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                                                                                                            (b) 
where   is wealth measured from 0 .  We require that the marginal utility and 
the second derivative for a decrease in wealth are both positive, as postulated by 
Kahneman and Tversky.  
 
ix Tversky and Kahneman (1992) assumed that the value function was of the power form. 
However, this is not suitable for the analysis of optimal gambling over mixed prospects, 
since for small stakes the assumption of loss-aversion is violated and the agent becomes 
infinitely gain loving as the stake approaches zero.  Let the value function be 
 
with  β α >   to ensure  that stake size is determinate. 
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The shape of  the indifference curve in expected return-win probability space is given by 
1 (1 )
(1 )                                                                          (d)
()
gp lp do w p s o
o
dp w p
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for large odds, so that the agent will not exhibit risk-loving behaviour over low 
probability gambles.  However, it can be shown that the agent will bet at actuarially 
unfair odds in this case if stakes are low enough.  With       the slope of the 
indifference curve in expected return- win probability space will be positive over some 
range, given that stake size is not too large. 
 
x Employing alternative functional forms made no qualitative difference [e.g. Prelec 
(1998), Wu and Gonzalez (1996)].  
 
xi This possibility receives some support from the empirical analysis of race-track betting 
by Jullien and Sallanie (2000). 
 
xii There is an observational equivalence between increasing (decreasing) s and decreasing 
(increasing) δ  in this model. 
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-
In this case EU is given by 
( )(1 )  w (1- ) (1- ) 0   (a)
where   is the gain from the gamble and   the loss;   is a constant, 0 <  1. 
Other parameters are constants as defined in the 
nn rg l EU w p e p e
gl n n
δδ λ
+− − =− − ≥
≤
text.  As  0, equation  (a) simplifies to
 the power function.  With   = 1 we have the exponential case.
We assume the following values:  14,  28,  0.0015,  0.7.







ions we assume the values found by Tversky  and Kahneman,
namely 0.61 for gains and 0.69 for losses.  We find with these parameter values 
 that (1)  the agent requires to win at  least $25.31 in order to accept a gamble 
incurring a  loss of  $10 at probability 0.5.  These numbers  are close to those 
 reported by Kahneman and Tversky.
         (2)  The agent will  accept the gamble  to win infinity or lose $100 at probability 0.5, 
and will, in fact,  accept the gamble at probability 0.5 for any gain exceeding $828.
Implications (1) and (2) might appear  reasonable a priori.  However, the same agent  
 (3) will also turn down a gamble involving the loss of  $10  with probability 0.924 





xiv The postulated degree of loss aversion is based partly on experimental evidence in 
which students required a “substantial” win of approximately $30 in order to induce them 
to bet $10 on a 50/50 chance.    
 
xv Note that in the exponential value function we can redefine   as the percentage of 
wealth (by deflating by total wealth and redefining the parameters).                                                                   
 
xvi  The literature on the psychology of gambling includes reference to the denial by 
pathological gamblers of the reality of their gambling situation, including the odds of 
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